



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF NOTICE

J-7

DISTRIBUTION: A, B, C

CJCS Notice 3500.01

10 October 2013

2014-2017 CHAIRMAN'S JOINT TRAINING GUIDANCE

References: See Enclosure B

1. Purpose. This notice provides the annual CJCS Joint Training Guidance to all DoD Components for the planning, execution, and assessment of joint individual, staff, and collective training for FYs 2014 to 2017. As an element of the Joint Strategic Planning System, this guidance and the Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation Program Goals and Objectives are intended to support development of FY 2015 Joint Training Plans (JTP). It may also guide adjustments to FY 2014 JTP scheduled training events and objectives to address emerging operational concerns and the Chairman' High-Interest Training Issues (HITIs).
2. Cancellation. CJCS Notice 3500.01, 9 October 2012, "2013-2016 Chairman's Joint Training Guidance," is canceled.
3. Applicability. This CJCS Notice applies to Combatant Commands (CCMDs), Services, the National Guard Bureau, combat support agencies (CSAs), Joint Staff directorates, and other joint organizations.
4. Background. A complex and uncertain strategic environment combined with fiscal constraints require that we be deliberate, selective, and judicious in determining and resourcing joint training priorities. Well informed choices will ensure preservation of required capabilities inherent in a ready joint force while facilitating pursuit of the capabilities required for Joint Force 2020 (JF2020) and globally integrated operations. We require a Joint Force capable of dominance in the 10 primary mission areas described in the defense strategic guidance (reference a). Globally integrated operations require a Joint Force that can rapidly form, evolve, dissolve, and reform as required.

a. Fundamental to a fully capable Joint Force is a renewed commitment to the Profession of Arms. Everyone serving in our total force has an important role in fostering a climate that reinforces professionalism, respect, core values, and trust. We must stay committed to maintaining our honor and integrity through courage and selfless service in performing our duties. As described in my *America's Military – A Profession of Arms White Paper* (reference b), trust is the foundation of our profession. Nowhere is this more important than our collective duty to eliminate sexual assault. Sexual assault breaks the trust that we must have in each other and in the chain of command. We must make every effort to prevent and eliminate sexual assault and when required, to respond appropriately. The key to prevention is ensuring all understand their roles and responsibilities in preventing sexual assault and that each has the courage to intervene when others are observed engaging in inappropriate behavior. A consistent and vigorous emphasis on Sexual Assault Prevention and Response training and education is crucial.

b. Joint training programs must align with the priorities of rebalancing to the Asia Pacific and maintaining a Middle East presence while renewing the foundational competence to conduct campaigns and major operations. Within current and projected fiscal constraints, multiple large and expensive exercises conducted by each CCMD will be limited. We must rethink our Joint Staff J-7 exercise support model. Support in FY 2014 will be scoped to available resources and will not be at the levels of previous years. In FY 2015 and beyond we need to implement a new model that accounts for fiscal realities, provides scalable options and prioritizes exercise support in line with the Department's priorities. Our focus must be on the consideration of cheaper training modes and the use of distributed joint training enablers to achieve multiple cross-CCMD joint training objectives.

c. The joint community must sustain training with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. Integration of all U.S. Government partners in joint training events is a necessity to ensure that we retain the versatility to effectively combine with all elements of U.S. national power to accomplish any mission.

d. JF2020 can only be fully realized by the continued efforts of all joint training stakeholders. The operational concept of globally integrated operations suggests a number of force development implications detailed in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO) (reference c). Of special note for joint trainers are the creation of training conditions and environments that enable the practice of mission command during training events; operating in denied, manipulated, and/or contested cyberspace; conventional and special operations forces integration; cross-CCMD coordination and synchronization; operational contract support integration, and the use of Mission Partner Environment (reference d) to facilitate partner

integration. Exercises should be leveraged to evaluate mature concepts that support the continued development of joint doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). We will implement the IRON CRUCIBLE Series of CJCS Joint Force War Games to operationalize and refine these concepts.

e. In line with our efforts to develop JF2020 and my focus on the Profession of Arms, we have completed a review of joint education to ensure we are developing agile and adaptive leaders with the requisite values, strategic vision, and critical thinking skills necessary to keep pace with the changing strategic environment. A primary focus of the review was to develop a set of Desired Leader Attributes (DLAs) required for the leaders of JF2020. I have approved a set of DLAs for adoption by the joint community as guideposts for joint officer leader development for JF2020 (reference e). This effort has significant implications to both the training and education communities as we move forward in meeting my intent to institutionalize the essential knowledge, skills, attributes, and behaviors that define our profession. Those DLAs are as follows:

(1) The ability to understand the environment and the effect of all instruments of national power.

(2) The ability to anticipate and adapt to surprise and uncertainty.

(3) The ability to recognize change and lead transitions.

(4) The ability to operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding (Mission Command).

(5) The ability to make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the Profession of Arms.

(6) The ability to think critically and strategically in applying joint warfighting principles and concepts to joint operations.

5. Action or Procedure.

a. The Director, Joint Force Development (Joint Staff J-7):

(1) Develops and implements procedures for the CJCS to review Combatant Commander, Service, and Joint Staff joint training plans.

(2) Manages the CE2T2 program in support of Service and CCMD training programs.

(3) Supports training and exercise programs that sustain joint force readiness and capabilities.

(4) Facilitates the incorporation of cross-CCMD coordination, mission command, and cross domain synergy into CCMD and Service exercises.

(5) Implements a Joint Task Force headquarters training capability to support the readiness of Service-designated headquarters to operate as Joint Task Force-capable headquarters.

(6) In coordination with CCMDs and Services, assesses adherence to this guidance and overall progress in training HITIs.

(7) In coordination with USSTRATCOM, USCYBERCOM, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff, continues to support flexible, relevant, and persistent cyberspace training. Support the realistic replication of the cyberspace domain to include the expansion of dedicated cyber ranges. Provide staffs the opportunities to practice and develop TTPs to operate and complete missions regardless of the cyberspace conditions while also providing secure range environments to allow cyberspace operations professionals the opportunity to hone skills and TTPs against realistic cyber threats.

(8) Ensures Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) supports delivery of distributed joint training capability. Synchronize JKO development and delivery of relevant, tailored, and measurable distributed training products, including blended learning training packages (BLTPs) with joint training stakeholders.

b. Commander, USSTRATCOM:

(1) Coordinates with Services, as appropriate, to direct Computer Network Defense Service Providers (CNDSP) and other related organizations, to participate, when feasible, in the planning, execution and assessment of CCMD and Service network training events and exercises. Additionally, synchronize and support Service and Combatant Command Red Team requirements.

(2) Assumes the joint lead for integrating and synchronizing Joint Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) training in accordance with reference f.

c. Combatant Commanders, Chief, National Guard Bureau, and CSA Directors:

(1) Incorporate realistic cyberspace operations environments to support robust cyberspace threats and realistic offensive cyberspace, defensive cyberspace, and Department of Defense Information Network operations.

Develop a cyberspace operations training program, which includes robust Red Team operations in training events and exercises in order to develop capabilities and TTPs to sustain combat and other essential operations in a denied or manipulated cyberspace environment. Include periods stressing mission command in a denied and contested command and control (C2) system environment in exercises. Update standard operating procedures and TTPs following these exercises to incorporate lessons learned from operating in denied, manipulated, and/or contested cyberspace environments.

(2) Integrate degraded space environments into exercises and training. Training objectives should include conditions whereby the training audience operates in and through the denied/degraded space environment, to include loss of satellite communications and positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities.

(3) Better synchronize joint training and security cooperation activities by using the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System. Use the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS) and the Joint Lessons Learned Information System to document observations from exercises in accordance with the deliberate observation validation process to ensure we capture, learn and apply joint lessons through the timely sharing of key and crosscutting observations and lessons (references g and h).

(4) Incorporate available JKO and BLTP (or equivalent) resources into ongoing individual and staff training and exercise events. As feasible, use these capabilities to prepare training audiences for participation in collective training exercises. Ensure sponsored content on JKO is current.

(5) Review and consider applicability of the lessons and recommendations from the U.S. Pacific Command Exercise Program Study Report (reference i). Specific areas of interest include more effectively linking exercise objectives to theater campaign plan intermediate military objectives during requirement identification and JTP development as well as exploring ways to achieve additional efficiencies during event planning and event execution.

(6) Pursue opportunities during training and exercises to sustain integration with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners and address and coordinate cross-CCMD operational issues and requirements.

(7) Sustain development of a fully mature training assessment process that supports identification of training shortfalls and contributes to the overall organizational readiness assessment process.

(8) Consider the incorporation of training objectives into joint training and exercises that reinforce the essential knowledge, skills, attributes, and behaviors described by the DLAs.

(9) Annually brief the CJCS on their joint training plans.

d. The Military Services:

(1) Focus Joint National Training Capability service training program accreditation/certification nominations on tasks that incorporate High Interest Training Requirements (HITRs) that align with the HITIs in Enclosure A.

(2) Use HITRs to focus training and prepare conventional forces for joint employment by the CCMDs.

(3) Incorporate realistic cyberspace conditions, to include robust Red Team operations, into exercises in order to develop capabilities and TTPs to sustain combat and other essential operations in a denied or manipulated cyberspace environment. Update standard operating procedures and TTPs following these exercises to incorporate lessons learned from operating in denied or manipulated environments. Leverage CNDSPs to ensure that cyber training is maximized during exercises and that Red Teams are granted the maximum amount of freedom possible to fully stress C2 during exercises.


(4) Annually brief the CJCS on plans for training their forces in support of Combatant Commander requirements.

6. High-Interest Training Issues. HITIs are focus areas that commanders should consider for emphasis in their joint training programs. The HITIs at Enclosure A reflect capabilities required of the Joint Force and do not reflect a higher-to-lower ranking of priorities. Each command should incorporate relevant mission-specific aspects of these HITIs into its joint and/or Service training program.

7. High-Interest Training Requirements. HITRs are capability requirements identified by Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) to support specific theater objectives. CCMD HITRs are developed annually and should inform Service development of joint capable forces. CCMD HITRs are recommended for force provider action in the CJCS JTP Tab H published in JTIMS (reference j).

8. Releasability. This notice is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DoD components (to include the CCMDs), other Federal Agencies, and the public may obtain copies of this notice at reference k.

9. Effective Date. This notice is effective upon receipt. It expires 31 August 2014.



MARTIN E. DEMPSEY
General, U.S. Army

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Enclosures:

- A - High Interest Training Issues
- B - References

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ENCLOSURE A

HIGH-INTEREST TRAINING ISSUES

The HITIs in this enclosure represent operational focus areas that are consistent with the priorities established in defense strategic guidance (reference a), the Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force (reference l) and the CCJO (reference c), and must be an integral part of joint training programs.

1. Sexual Assault Prevention and Response. Services, CSAs, and Combatant Commands should advocate a robust Sexual Assault and Prevention program and provide individual education and training to prevent and appropriately respond to incidents of sexual assault (reference m).
2. Ethics, Values and Leadership. Incorporate moral, legal, and ethical decision-making into training. Training will emphasize a leader's role as principal steward of precious resources, both organic and contracted, and challenge the leader to continually assess whether an action, even if legally permissible, is also prudent.
3. Joint Operational Access. The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) (reference n) articulates 30 capabilities needed for joint forces and their intergovernmental mission partners to achieve operational access through the successful application of cross-domain synergy. Each of these focus areas directly align with Force Development implications described in the CCJO, and are imperatives not only for the current force, but in the development of Joint Force 2020. Joint training at all levels should incorporate and mitigate appropriate anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats and capabilities described in the JOAC. Cross-CCMD exercises as well as joint, tactical-level training that focus on cross-domain synergy to counter A2/AD threats in depth should be designed and exercised. Training will emphasize quickly combining capabilities from across the Joint Force and with mission partners as an intrinsic element of executing globally integrated operations in an operating environment characterized by accelerating rates of change. Our joint training and exercise programs must support mastery of these capabilities with focus in the areas cited below.

- a. Space. Access to and dependence on satellites in support of military operations is an essential capability that must be protected. It is likely that capable adversaries will interfere with our use of this domain. Commands, components, and Services should integrate degraded space environments into exercises and training. Joint training objectives should require the training audience to operate in and through the denied/degraded space environment, to

include loss of satellite communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities.

b. Ballistic and cruise missile defense. Increase awareness of the existing capabilities for integrating air and missile defense and incorporate associated air and missile defense training objectives into homeland, regional, and theater training events, when appropriate. The ballistic and cruise missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively (reference o). Emphasize joint and coalition planning processes that enable CCDRs to execute air and missile defense within their areas of responsibility (AORs), across adjacent and multiple AORs, and globally in support of defense of the homeland from air and or missile attack. Ensure that full spectrum Missile Warning is integrated into existing exercises and widen the breadth of participation for a more vigorous sensor to decision maker exercise program.

c. Conventional warfighting. Restore proficiency to conduct full-spectrum operational-level warfare in order to complete reset and reconstitution of the force. Training should stress the synergistic and holistic employment of joint force, interagency, and multi-national partner lethal and non-lethal fires. Exercising all aspects of joint operational access will provide opportunities for the joint force to practice these skills at the tactical through operational levels of command.

d. Operational and tactical maneuver. After a decade of focus on the relatively confined geographic limits of stability operations and counterinsurgency, the joint force must restore its ability to maneuver over distance. Reestablish foundational competency in operational and tactical maneuver, focusing on cross-domain synergy. Innovative and collaborative approaches are required in order to achieve this objective affordably.

4. Cyberspace Operations. The ability to operate effectively in and through cyberspace is essential to operations. Particular attention must be paid to understanding and disseminating information on cyber vulnerabilities or new capabilities that are discovered during exercises or operations (references p, q, r, s, and t).

a. Cyberspace training must simulate today's information environment to allow operators to assess their ability to integrate cyberspace effects in support of Commander's operations and activities. Realistic cyberspace threats and capabilities will be replicated in the training environment. Commands, components, and Services should integrate cyber Red Team and cyber aggressor forces into exercises and training with the greatest amount of freedom possible.

b. Joint training at all levels must regularly incorporate and evaluate cyberspace operations training objectives to develop and refine the ability to operate in a denied or manipulated environment, and to execute continuity of operations plans. Use of capabilities such as the Joint Information Operations Range for exercise support should be maximized.

c. In consultation with the Director, Joint Force Development (Joint Staff J7), the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation will select exercises for Information Assurance assessment. Assessments must include the appropriate levels of planning, execution, and assessment from the organization conducting the event that this high-visibility, limited-resource event requires.

d. Cyber Mission Forces (National Mission Teams, Combat Mission Teams and Cyber Protection Teams) will be constituted, employed, and routinely integrated into the planning and execution of joint training events. These Cyber Mission Forces will hone team proficiency and support the refinement of operational constructs, training standards, and doctrine (reference t).

5. Irregular Warfare. Recognizing that irregular warfare (IW) is as strategically important as traditional warfare, commands and deploying forces must be equally effective in both forms of warfare. CCMDs and components will conduct training to sustain and improve IW capabilities and develop TTPs. State and non-state adversaries will continue to engage in IW against the United States, its allies, and partner nations either exclusively or as a component of a larger campaign taking indirect and asymmetric approaches. The proliferation of advanced technologies, to include weapons of mass destruction and cyber, will increasingly imbue adversaries with global reach, disruptive capacity, and lethality. Components must be prepared to independently influence or support relevant populations to counter the IW threat. The most effective deterrence of IW occurs during the conduct of stability operations and other security cooperation activities with partner and host nations.

a. Sustain and maintain relevancy of joint training for Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities through the integration of staff and unit collective training programs and joint exercises.

b. As part of exercises and pre-deployment training, components will ensure that conventional and special operation forces understand their evolving and respective roles for successful integration and execution of counterinsurgency, counter terrorism, SFA, Foreign Internal Defense, and Information Operations.

c. Command, component, and service training should support regionally aligned forces' language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness. Maximize individual and collective training initiatives that reinforce understanding escalation-of-force procedures and minimizing civilian casualties. Integrate consideration of potential civilian casualties into fire support planning and the deliberate and dynamic targeting processes (reference u). Exercise procedures for preparing for and responding to incidents of civilian casualties and other unintended consequences.

d. Sustain IW activities including Unconventional Warfare in CCDR joint training events. Conduct wargames on military support to conflict prevention, assess sources of instability and the measures that must be taken to minimize and deter conflict before they arise to reduce specific threats or promote conditions conducive to peace and stability.

6. Information Operations. Incorporate Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs) into training and exercises. Training for Information Operations (IO) should focus on the synergistic integration of IRCs, IO assessments, and the cognitive, informational and physical elements of the Information Environment (IE), and emphasize:

a. Planning Integration. Joint training should stress the synergistic employment of IRCs across the dimensions of the IE to enhance effectiveness and compensate for vulnerabilities. Special emphasis should be placed on plan refinement and assessment of the IE through cogent and relevant measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.

b. Intelligence Integration. Emphasize TTPs for IO Intelligence Integration in order to improve both understanding the IE, and the effect of IRCs on adversary and potential adversary actors.

c. Partner Integration. Joint training objectives should include interagency and multinational partner coordination of information sharing strategies and IO planning within the global operational environment.

d. Strategic Integration. Emphasize integration of intra-theater and trans-regional effects and coordination. Joint training should include the coordination required to ensure effects are planned, accounted for, synchronized, and deconflicted at the strategic level.

7. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Exercise effective, operational decision making through the exploitation of real-time information/intelligence during planning and execution processes. Emphasize the effective integration and synchronized employment of sensors and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capabilities into the joint force commander's decision cycle. Ensure operational-level Joint and Service

training, component staff training and exercise objectives stress the early identification of collection requirements and staff collaboration required for the effective management and optimal employment of limited sensors, assets and associated PED systems (references v and w).

a. Joint training at home station and combat training centers should emphasize integrating national and theater-level collection and PED capabilities into tactical level operations to ensure units are able to immediately employ supporting capabilities upon entry into a theater of operations. Incorporate ISR into Joint individual training objectives aimed at enhancing staff collaboration required to effectively manage the employment of sensors, assets, and associated PED systems. Scenarios must emphasize training for unit leadership to ensure proper incorporation of new sensors and PED systems and products into unit TTPs.

b. Maximize joint training on sensors and PED capabilities using real or synthetic systems. Synthetic systems may be replicated through appropriate model and simulation systems.

8. Homeland Defense/Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Continue to develop and implement programs to train units, leaders, and staffs in homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities, including required chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management skills. Exercise and evaluate domestic consequence management operations in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments. Emphasize the coordination of Active and Reserve Component forces, including National Guard in State Active Duty, title 32 and title 10 statuses. Continue to collaborate with federal, state, and local partners with specialized planning, exercises, and TTPs to respond to natural and manmade disasters.

9. Integration of Special Operations Forces with Conventional Forces. Joint training will emphasize special operations forces (SOF)/conventional force (CF) integration for joint operations across the range of military operations (references x, y, and z). SOF/CF integration will focus on training, advising, and assisting foreign conventional security forces; supporting foreign internal defense missions, and conducting counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. Predeployment training will focus on command relationships and emphasize the opportunity to exercise and rehearse prior to employment in theater.

10. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) training should fully address four elements that comprise DoD's approach to Countering WMD: Prepare, Prevent Acquisition, Contain and Roll Back Threats, and Respond to Crises. Emphasize training that addresses Proliferation Security Initiatives and reinvigorate capabilities

that have declined by integrating WMD events into overarching collective training.

11. Nuclear Deterrence/Nuclear Command, Control and Communications.

Accomplish training to ensure the Nuclear Command, Control and Communications procedures required to accomplish effective Nuclear Deterrence are maintained at the highest standards. CCMD and National command centers that have Emergency Action Procedures responsibilities (references aa and ab) should participate in training events that include multiple command centers. Command Centers are encouraged to participate in USSTRATCOM Integrated Mission Area Training events to meet this requirement. Consideration should be given to participation by CCMDs with these responsibilities in USSTRATCOM exercise GLOBAL THUNDER.

12. Joint Logistics Enterprise. Full spectrum cross-domain capability is facilitated by a robust and effective sustainment system. Joint logistics must be routinely practiced to create and sustain proficiency. Exercises must include strategic and operational distribution, and deployment, to include deployment planning for organic and contracted forces at the operational and strategic levels of command. Employment of rapid port opening capabilities, to include seaport and airfield damage repair, should be exercised to improve our ability to establish, sustain, and recover expeditionary distribution networks. Ensure Operational Contract Support and joint medical support planning and execution are fully incorporated into joint training and exercises.

ENCLOSURE B

REFERENCES

- a. Department of the Defense, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," January 2012
- b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, undated, "America's Military – A Profession of Arms White Paper"
- c. "Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020," 10 September 2012
- d. JROCM 026-13, "Future Mission Network 90 Day Study Report," 5 February 2013
- e. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Desired Leader Attributes for Joint Force 2020," 28 June 2013
- f. Deputy Secretary of Defense, "Joint Ballistic Missile Defense Training," 26 August 2012
- g. CJCSI 3500.01 Series, "Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States"
- h. CJCSI 3150.25 Series, "The Joint Lessons Learned Program"
- i. Joint Staff J-7 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division, "U.S. Pacific Command Exercise Program Study Report," 5 February 2013
- j. Joint Training Information Management System link at <http://jtims.js.smil.mil/jtims> (SIPRNET - accessed 22 May 2013)
- k. "CJCS Directives Electronic Library," Information Management Division, 24 April 2013, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/cjcs.htm (NIPRNET - accessed 22 May 2013)
- l. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force," 6 February 2012
- m. DoDI 6495.02, "Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures," 28 March 2013
- n. "Joint Operational Access Concept," version 1.0, 17 January 2012

- o. Department of Defense, "Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report," February 2010
- p. Department of Defense, "DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (DSOC)," July 2011
- q. CJCS Strategic Seminar II Final Report, March 2012
- r. CJCS Order dated 112040z February 2011, "Execute Order to Incorporate Realistic Cyberspace Conditions into Major DoD Exercises"
- s. CJCS Order dated 142339z June 2013, "Mod One to EXORD to Incorporate Realistic Cyberspace Conditions into Major DoD Exercises"
- t. JP 3-12, "Cyberspace Operations," 5 February 2013
- u. Joint Staff J-7 Joint and Coalition Warfare Operational Analysis Division, "CIVCAS Update Study," 4 April 2012
- v. JP 2-01, "Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations"
- w. JP 2-0, "Joint Intelligence," 22 June 2007
- x. JP 3-0, "Joint Operations," 11 August 2011
- y. JP 3-05, "Special Operations," 18 April 2011
- z. JP 3-05.1, "Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations," 26 April 2007
- aa. CJCSI 3280.01 Series, "National Military Command System (NMCS)"
- ab. CJCSI 6810.04 Series, "Nuclear Command, Control and Communications Personnel Performance Objectives and Assessment Criteria"